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Summary findings
Schiff examines the impact of various trade  policies for  likely to harm those countries. The ACP countries should
small developing states in the  face of changing  liberalize their trade regimes to reduce the size of
international trends-including globalization,  the  transfers to the European  Union.
proliferation  of regional  integration agreements,  the  * Small states should sign  free trade agreements  with
changing relationship  between African,  Caribbean,  and  the rest of the OECD  and pursue  multilateral
Pacific (ACP) countries and the European  Union, the  liberalization.
erosion of ACP preferences  in the  EU market,  the  * Small states and other developing countries should
Everything-But-Arms  Initiative  (a 2001 EU initiative  intensify South-South regional cooperation  in the area of
providing  49 developing countries free  access to EU  regional public goods.
markets),  and the negotiations  on the Free Trade  * The EU and other OECD countries should  provide
Agreement of the Americas.  The author concludes  that:  country-specific technical  assistance  for "behind the
- The participants  in South-South  regional integration  border" reforms  in small states-something specified  in
agreements  should further reduce  their external trade  the Cotonou Agreement for ACP countries-as well as
barriers.  assistance in implementing  their commitments  under
o  The trade component of the Cotonou Agreement  World Trade Organization agreements.
between  the ACP countries and the European Union  is
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3Regional Integration and Development  in Small States
1. Introduction
Small  states  differ  from other  economies  in a number  of aspects,  including their
greater vulnerability  to changes  in the  external  environment.1 This has  been recognized
by the  WTO  (World  Trade  Organization)  (2001)  which has  agreed  to examine  issues
relating  to  the trade  of small  economies.2 Recent  changes  in  the  external  environment
include the change  in the relationship  between the  EU (European Union)  and the ACP
(African,  Carribean  and  Pacific)  countries,  the  erosion  of  ACP  preferences  in  EU
markets,  negotiation of the FTAA  (Free  Trade Area of the  Americas),  and the  general
proliferation of trade blocs. This paper addresses these issues, including what small states
should do about them.
The  policy  options  of  small  states  are  constrained  by  their  endowments,  their
institutional  development  and  their past  policies.  Small  states  are  also  constrained  by
bilateral,  regional  and/or  multilateral  commitments  with  respect  to  their  trade  policy.
Some  international  constraints  on  policy  may  be  beneficial  (e.g.,  membership  in the
WTO is likely to improve policy credibility) while others are likely to be harmful.
Table  1 shows the list of 41  small states as defined by the World Bank (column  1).
Most of them are also signatories to the ACP-EU  Cotonou Agreement (column 2).  Only
14 of them are least developed countries or LDCs (least developed  countries) (column 3).
Most are  members  (27) or observers  (8) of the WTO (35 in total; column  5), 30 of them
l For a different view, see Srinivasan (1986). He argues that the economic and social problems some of the
small states face are not necessarily due to smallness.
2  The  Draft  Ministerial  Declaration  for the  Fourth  Session  of the  WTO's  Ministerial  Conference  states
(paragraph  30,  page  7):  "We  agree to  a work programme,  under  the  auspices  of the General  Council,  to
examine  issues  relating  to the  trade  of small  economies  ...  The  General Council  shall review  the work
programme and make recommendations  for action to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial  Conference."
4are members  of the  Commonwealth  (column 6)  and 28 are members of the  SIDS (UN
grouping  of "Small  Island Developing  States";  column  4).  Column  7  shows that  small
states belong to a total of seventeen regional  integration agreements  (RIAs), most belong
to at least one RIA, and  several belong to from two to four RIAs. Note that this paper is
only concerned  with low-income  small states and not with high-income  ones (such as the
Bahamas, Bahrain, Cyprus, Malta and Qatar).
With  increased  globalization,  the  expansion  and deeper  integration  of large  trade
blocs, the changing relationship  between the EU and ACP countries, the latter's erosion
of preferences  in EU markets,  and  FTAA negotiations, small  states are  facing important
decisions  about the types of policies to pursue in order to minimize the costs of adverse
changes  and  take  advantage  of beneficial  ones.  The  alternative  policy  choices  include
unilateral  trade  liberalization  (UTL)  and  related  domestic  reforms,  South-South
integration  among  small  states or  between small  states  and other  developing  countries,
improved  South-South  cooperation  on  regional  public  goods,  North-South  integration
between  small  states  and  large  Northern  partners  or  blocs-including  the  FTAA  and
relations between ACP countries and the EU, and liberalizing multilaterally.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 examines the impact
of South-South  RIAs among  small  states or between  small  states  and other developing
countries  on the welfare of the RIA'as well as on individual member countries,  and Sub-
section  2.1  provides  implications.  Section 3 analyzes  South-South  regional  cooperation
on public goods  (Sub-section  3.1), for  international  negotiations  (Sub-section  3.2),  and
the  link between RIAs  and  regional  cooperation  (Sub-section  3.3).  Section  4 examines
3 Valdes  and  McCalla  (1999)  provide  more  detailed  country  classifications.  They also  show that  some
small states are very dependent  on food imports, with the ratio of the value offood imports to total exports
equal to  1.99 for Gambia,  1.68 for Grenada,  2.12 for Kiribati and 2.31  for Samoa.
5RIAs  between  small  states  and Northern  countries  or blocs.  Sub-section  4.1  describes
existing agreements  and the eroding  preferences  in the EU, Sub-section 4.2 analyzes the
welfare  implications,  Sub-section  4.3  looks  at  technical  assistance  for  "behind  the
border"  reform,  Sub-section  4.4  examines  implications  for credibility  and FDI  (foreign
direct  investment),  and  Sub-section  4.5  examines  "hub  and  spoke"  issues.  Section  5
concludes with a set of policy recommendations.
Unlike  standard  trade theory, the  theory of regional  integration has  been able  to
produce  almost  no  unambiguous  results.  Thus,  fully  unambiguous  policy
recommendations  are typically not feasible in this area. Nevertheless,  results from recent
theoretical,  empirical  and  case  study  research  enables  us to  provide  reasonably  robust
case-specific policy advice. This paper provides such advice in the case of small states.
2. South-South RIAs
A  number  of small  states  have  formed  South-South  RlAs  (such  as  CARICOM
(Carribean  Community  and Common  Market)  and the  OECS  (Organization  of Eastern
Caribbean  States);  see notes in  Table  I for definitions)  or have joined other developing
countries  in  South-South  RIAs  (AFTA  (Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations
(ASEAN)  FTA); SAARC (South Asian Association  for Regional Cooperation);  CEMAC
(Communaute  Economique  et Monetaire  de l'Afrique centrale (Economic  and Monetary
Community  of  Central  Africa));  SACU  (Southern  African  Customs  Union);  SADC
(Southern  African  Development  Community);  UEMOA  (Union  Economique  et
Monetaire  Ouest-africaine  (West  African  Economic  and Monetary  Union));  and  more;
6see Table  1).  And in July 2001,  CARICOM  heads of government decided to finalize  the
CARICOM  "Single Market and Economy" by early 2003.
As  several  studies  have  concluded,  a  South-South  RIA that  provides  preferential
access to its member states but keeps  its external  trade  policy with respect to the ROW
(resi  of the  world)  unchanged  is  likely  to  lower  welfare  for  the  bloc  as  a  whole
(Panagariya,  1997;  Schiff,  1997;  World Bank,  2000). Some member countries  may also
gain at the expense of others and I return to this below.4
The reason South-South RIAs  are likely to result in a welfare loss for the bloc as a
whole is as follows. Assume first that imports are homogeneous,  i.e., their characteristics
do not depend on the  country of origin.  It is likely that members  of South-South  RIAs
will  continue  to  import from the excluded  countries  after the  formation  of the RIA  (as
found  by  Amjadi  and  Winters,  1999,  for  MERCOSUR  (Mercado  Comun  del  Sur
(Southern  Cone Common Market)).  In that case, prices cannot fall since domestic prices
continue  to be  equal  to world prices  plus  the  tariff on  imports  from the  ROW.  Since
prices  are  unchanged  following  the  formation  of the  RIA,  output,  consumption  and
imports are unchanged  as well.  Since total  imports do not increase, there can be no trade
creation.  However,  imports from other member countries  increase after removal of intra-
bloc trade barriers,  at the expense of cheaper imports from excluded countries.  This trade
diversion  lowers the welfare of the bloc as a whole.
Liberalizing  trade  with  the  ROW  can  turn  harmful  RIAs  into  beneficial  ones  if
liberalization  is deep  enough.  Thus,  the best way to  insure that  South-South  RIAs are
4  An exception may be Botswana,  a member of SACU.  Since the external trade policy of SACU has been
determined by South Africa,  interest groups in Botswana  have  had  no influence  on it and resources  have
not been wasted  on rent seeking activities by these  groups in order to influence  trade policy in their favor.
This  has  been  of great  benefit  to  Botswana,  which seems  to  have  gained  from  membership  in  SACU,
though  it has been argued that SACU is more properly viewed  as a North-South than a South-South RIA.
7beneficial  is  for member  countries  to  liberalize  their trade  regime  with  respect  to  the
ROW.
If imported goods  are heterogeneous,  say because the  quality of goods  differs  by
country of origin, then the  price of the member countries'  imports is likely to fall under
competition,  with  an  ambiguous  impact  on  welfare.  However,  if exports  to the  small
member states  by larger  member countries  are  made under  non-competitive  conditions,
then the  exporting  countries  may  appropriate  all  or  most of the  rent  created  by  the
removal of tariffs on intra-bloc  trade and small states are likely to lose.
In  fact,  there  are  other  reasons  why  the  larger  and  more  developed  member
countries  are likely to benefit at the expense of the smaller and less developed  ones. This
asymmetric  distribution  of gains  and losses  is reflected  in  the  fact that the  larger  and
more  developed  economies  of CARICOM  (Barbados,  Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  Tobago)
welcomed  the decision to finalize  a CARICOM  "Single  Market and Economy" by early
2003,  while  "  ...  smaller and  economically  weaker territories  have  strong  doubts  over
whether they will benefit in the near and medium term,  given the relative backwardness
of their goods and tradable services sector."  (Oxford Analytica,  July 31, 2001).
Why do larger and more developed members  typically gain from a RIA relative to
smaller  and poorer members?  One reason is that the former usually have a trade surplus
with  the  latter.  The  larger  and  more  developed  countries  tend  to  produce  protected
manufactures  which compete  with imports  from the ROW and which are exported  to the
smaller,  poorer  neighboring  countries.  Once the RIA is formed,  these manufactures  are
sold to the poorer countries free of tariffs. This results in a transfer of tariff revenues from
the poorer  to  the  more  developed  countries  (without benefit  for the  consumers  in the
8poorer countries  since prices do not fall due to the unchanged tariffs on imports from the
ROW).  This is equivalent to a worsening  of (improvement in) the terms of trade  for the
poorer (more developed) member countries.
Consequently,  not only  is  it likely that  the trade  bloc  as  a whole  will lose  from
forming a RIA but the smaller  and poorer member countries  will lose  even more, while
the  more  developed  members  are  more  likely  to  gain.  A  second  reason  for  the
asymmetric  gains  and  losses  is related to agglomeration  effects, whereby industry  tends
to  leave the  smaller and poorer  members  and agglomerate  in the  more  developed  ones
once trade barriers between them are  removed.  A third reason is related to the fact that
South-south  RIAs tend to generate  dynamic  divergence,  with the poorer members  losing
relative to the more developed ones (World Bank, 2000).
The  asymmetric  distribution  of gains and losses from  a RIA can result in tensions
and even conflict between  member  countries  (World  Bank,  2000).  This occurred  in the
1960s when the East African Community broke down because of Tanzania and Uganda's
dissatisfaction  with what they perceived to be an unfair distribution of revenues  in favor
of (the  more  developed)  Kenya.  The  same occurred  in the Central  American  Common
Market  in the  1960s, when Honduras  left the RIA  after the more developed  El Salvador
refused  to  renegotiate  the  distribution  of revenues.  And  poorer  regions  have  tried  to
secede because of the unfavorable trade policy imposed on them by the dominant region.
Such regions  include the Southern  part of the  US  in the  19"  century  and  East Pakistan
(later Bangladesh) in the 1  970s.
One  way to mitigate the problem  associated with the asymmetric  distribution of
gains  and  losses  is to have  a compensatory  mechanism  put in place  as part of the  CU
9agreement.  This is the case for the UEMOA, where compensation  is based on intra-bloc
trade  flows  prevailing  before  the  agreement  was  signed.  This  does  help  mitigate  the
problem but does not fully resolve it because intra-bloc trade tends to increase following
the  formation  of the  CU  (Customs  Union),  and  the  related  increase  in  the  level  of
transfers is not compensated for.
Another  way  to  mitigate  the  problem  is  to  lower  the  common  external  tariff
(CET) because this reduces  the size of intra-bloc transfers, whether positive or negative.
Of course,  the  member  country  that  obtains  positive  transfers  from  the  CU  may be
unwilling to go along and lower the  CET. That is where a FTA (Free  Trade Area) has a
clear advantage because it enables  each member country to liberalize its trade policy with
the  ROW  unilaterally  and thus reduce  the  size of the  transfers  it may  be  providing  its
partners.5
2.1. Implications
An implication  from the  above  is that small states that are members of South-South
RIAs  will benefit from lowering  external  trade barriers  with respect to  the ROW.  They
will  benefit  economically  from  the  standard  gains  from  trade,  and  they  will  gain
politically  (be politically more sustainable)  because lower external barriers  will mitigate
the  size  of transfers  from  the  less to  the  more  developed  member countries  and  will
dampen any potential frictions between them.
5 Note that  the  scarcest resource  for  a small state  is the administrative  capacity  needed  to  deal  with the
large  number  of bilateral,  regional  and  multilateral  issues  it  faces  (see  Section  3.2  below).  RIAs  are
typically  complex  and  require  large  amounts  of administrative  resources  both  for  negotiation  and  for
operating  it. Given  the  low,  if not negative,  welfare  impact of South-South  RIAs,  it  is  likely  that such
resources could be used more productively  for the management of  essential public programs.
10The  World  Bank  Trade  Blocs  Policy  Research  Report  (2000)  concludes  that
North-South  RIAs are likely to be superior to  South-South RIAs, though not necessarily
to UTL. In this context, note that in July 2001, the Organisation of African Unity adopted
a treaty defining  a new organization,  the  African  Union  (AU), modeled  directly  on the
EU  (Oxford  Analytica,  July  18,  2001).  The  move  toward  increased  integration  in
Africa-a region  with  ten small  states--seems  to  be  in the  opposite  direction  of what
experience  and  theory  about  regional  integration  would  recommend.  And the  focus  on
this  issue  and  the  related  use  of scarce  administrative  and  other  resources  is  likely to
distract  from  the  important  reforms  needed  to  accelerate  development  in  the  region.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the CARICOM "Single Market and Economy"  initiative
will provide the answer to the challenges member countries  are likely to face  in the near
and medium term.
3. Regional Cooperation
3.1. Regional Public Goods
If countries deal  with regional  public  goods individually,  without  internalizing  the
effect on other countries  in the region, it may result in what has been called "the tragedy
of  the  commons"  or  "prisoner's  dilemma"  where  everyone  loses  due  to  a  lack  of
cooperation.  Thus,  regional  cooperation  on public goods-such  as  water basins  (lakes,
rivers),  infrastructure  (roads,  railways,  dams),  the  environment,  hydroelectric  and  other
sources of energy, fisheries, and more-- can generate large benefits.
Regional  cooperation has been supported by the  World Bank across the developing
world,  together with other multilateral, regional  and bilateral  agencies.  The  World Bank
11provides expertise, financing  and credibility.  The latter is often crucial for the success of
the project  because joint projects  imply binding  commitments  and  thus  some  loss of
sovereignty,  and  countries  may  not  fully  trust  their  neighbors  to  comply  with  their
commitments. The World Bank can also help when power relations are asymmetric.  For
instance,  the  Caribbean  countries  successfully  cooperated  in resolving  the  problem  of
refuse produced  by the  cruise lines,  and the World  Bank provided  important  support to
Caribbean countries in their negotiations with the cruise line companies.
3.2. International Negotiation
Other  areas  where  small  states  can  benefit  from  regional  cooperation  include
visibility and international negotiations. For instance, CARICOM has attained a degree of
visibility  that  no  single  member  could  have  hoped  to  attain  individually.  As  for
negotiations,  small states face severe disadvantages in their dealing with the ROW due to
low bargaining  power and high fixed costs of negotiation. Due to their small size,  small
states  do not usually  possess  the  needed  human  and physical  capacities  to unilaterally
conduct  all  the  bilateral  and  multilateral  negotiations  that  are  typical  for  developing
nations. Forming a regional  grouping with neighboring nations may help a country share
its fixed negotiation costs and increase its bargaining power. Andriamananjara  and Schiff
(2001)  have  shown that  the probability  that  small  states will cooperate,  as well  as  the
equilibrium group size (number of cooperating members), the optimal group size, and the
number of issues tackled,  all increase with the degree of similarity between the member
countries and with the level of international negotiation costs.
12Small  Caribbean  nations,  for example,  have benefited  from the establishment  of
CARICOM  under  which  they  have  pooled  their  negotiation  resources  and  have
formulated  common policy  stances  in negotiations  on trade  and investment  with  larger
countries or regional trade blocs.  Specifically, CARICOM  countries have been involved,
among  other  things,  in the  ACP-EU,  GATT/WTO  (General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and
Trade/WTO),  UNCTAD  (UN Conference  on Trade  and Development),  UNCLOS  (UN
Conference  on  the  Laws  of the  Sea) negotiations  as well  as in various  commissions  or
joint councils  with Canada,  Cuba, Japan, Mexico, the US (United  States), the FTAA, the
OAS  (Organization  of American  States),  the  G3  (Mexico,  Venezuela,  Colombia),  the
SELA  (Sistema  Econ6mico  Latinoamericano),  and  many  more.  Moreover,  by trading
each other's  support, the CARICOM  nations succeeded  in getting their nationals elected
to  key  international  positions  such  as  Commonwealth  Secretary-General  and  ACP
Secretary-General.
3.3.  RIAs and Regional Cooperation
One  question  is  whether  a  RIA  is  necessary  or  helpful  for  successful  regional
cooperation.  The literature  on this topic has not reached a consensus.  Schiff and Winters
(forthcoming)  conclude that, though a RIA may be helpful under the right circumstances,
it is by no means necessary.  RIAs can help foster an atrnosphere  of trust and a history of
negotiation that can help negotiations on regional public goods by embedding  them in a
wider  framework.  On the  other  hand,  as  discussed  in the  previous  section,  RIAs  can
result  in tensions  among member  countries  when the distribution of gains  and  losses  is
13asymmetric,  and  this  can  make  it  harder  to  reach  a  cooperative  solution  on  regional
public goods.
4. North-South RIAs
4.1. Existing Agreements and Preference  Erosion
Most  small  states  are  members  of the  ACP  agreements  with the  EU and  benefit
from  preferential  access  to  it.  Second,  the  EU's  2001  Everything-But-Arms  Initiative
(EBA) provides forty nine LDCs - not all small states - with free access to EU markets.
And New Zealand  and Norway have  created  their  own EBA-type  initiative (Hoekman,
2001).  Moreover,  Caribbean  countries  also benefit  from preferential  access  to the  US
(under the Caribbean Basin Initiative)  and to Canada (under CARIBCAN (Canada)). The
US has also recently  signed  the Africa Bill.  Finally, Caribbean  countries  and Belize  are
negotiating the FTAA with the other countries of the Western Hemisphere.
Small  states  are concerned with the expected  erosion of preferences,  especially in
the EU markets. These preferences are eroding because
i)  of the Uruguay Round, where the loss of preferences has been estimated at  I
percent for African and Pacific countries  and at 3 percent for Caribbean ones
(Overseas Development Institute study quoted in Bocquet,  1998);
ii)  the EU has signed a CU with Turkey and FTAs with Mediterranean countries
(Euro-Med  Agreements),  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  (Europe
Agreements),  South Africa and Mexico,  and is negotiating  with MERCOSUR
and  Chile,  all  of which  will  give  these  countries  a  tariff  regime  broadly
equivalent to Lome (EC DG-VIII,  Section 3.2, 1999);
14iii)  the  reform  of the  CAP  (Common  Agricultural  Policy)  will  lower  ACP
preferences in beef and veal;
iv)  the  WTO  ruling  against  the  EU  will  eliminate  preferences  on  bananas  by
2006; and
v)  the dismantling of the MFA (Multifiber Arrangement).
According to EC DG-VIII (1999), by the year 2000, Lome preferences should only be 2.9
percent on the basis of the MFN (Most Favored Nation) trade regime and 2 percent on the
basis of the GSP regime.
Moreover,  ACP countries will  only be able to maintain these eroding preferences
in  the  EU  markets  if  they  provide  reciprocity  to  the  EU,  i.e.,  if they  give  the  EU
preferential  access to their own markets. Based on a number of factors, including whether
the WTO would continue to provide waivers  for Lome-type  agreements,  the EU decided
to  replace the  Lome Convention  with  a  new  arrangement  (EC,  1997).  The  future  EU-
ACP relations  have been codified in the Cotonou Agreement,  which was signed  in June
2000. Its main principles  in the area of trade are reciprocity and differentiation.  The latter
means that conditions  for LDCs will differ from those for the  other ACP  countries (e.g.,
no reciprocity  requirement).
Reciprocity  means  that the EU will  form  FTAs with groups  of ACP  countries.  The
latter would first form their own RIAs (e.g.,  UEMOA,  CEMAC, EAC (Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda),  SADC, CARICOM)  and the EU in turn would form FTAs with them. The new
agreement  proposes  that  ACP  countries  enter  into  Economic  Partnership  Agreements
(EPAs)  with  the  EU,  either  as  regional  groups  (regional  EPAs  or  REPAs  (Regional
Economic  Partnership  Agreements))-the  option  favored  by the  EU-or  individually.
15Negotiations  on EPAs are due to start after September 2002 and be implemented by 2008
when the Cotonou Agreement ends.  Countries also have the choice of opting out of any
EPA with the EU. In that case, they would lose preferential access to EU markets, unless
they are members of the EBA.
The EBA provides forty nine LDCs access to the EU free of tariffs and quotas, with
immediate implementation except for transition periods for bananas,  rice and sugar where
tariffs  are  to  be  phased  out  over the  next  eight years.6 EBA  members  will be  able  to
maintain preferential  access to EU markets even if they do not enter into EPAs or REPAs
with the EU. The EBA agreement is an inexpensive step for the EU, and provides support
for  the poorest  nations  concerned.  However,  as  argued  in  Sub-section  4.2,  it may hurt
other developing  countries.7
4.2. Welfare Implications
Under the Cotonou Agreement, ACP countries (except the poorest) must grant the
EU  preferential  access.  This  is  likely  to  hurt  the  ACP  countries  overall.  From  their
viewpoint,  what matters  mainly are transfers of tariff revenues,  which may occur in the
absence  of any  efficiency  effects  of trade  creation  or  trade  diversion.  Opening  ACP
markets to the EU is likely to result in transfers of tariff revenues from ACP countries to
the  EU, and this will worsen their terms of trade and result in a welfare loss. The reason
is  that  since  ACP  imports  from  the  ROW  still  have  to  pay the  tariff,  prices  in ACP
countries  are unlikely to fall  with the Cotonou Agreement.  Thus, the EU will be able to
6Not all members of the EBA group are members  of the ACP, though many are.
7Note that the trade component of the Cotonou Agreement is still subject to review by the WTO, and that it
is not certain to be implementable  in practice.
16sell its exports to ACP countries at a higher price because they will enter duty-free, and it
will be able to capture all or most of the tariff revenue that it was paying before.
If EU products are  imperfect  substitutes  for non-EU ones and  are competitively
supplied, the price of EU exports to ACP countries may fall following the tariff cuts, and
the  worsening  in ACP  countries  terms  of trade  will  be  dampened,  with  an  ambiguous
impact on ACP countries'  welfare.  However,  if, as is  likely, EU  firms supplying  small
ACP countries have considerable market power, they will be able to capture  much of the
tariff  cut  themselves.  This  implies  that  the  loss  in ACP  countries'  terms  of trade  is
unlikely  to  be  dampened  in those  cases  where  EU and non-EU  products  are  imperfect
substitutes.
Countries  can choose not to enter into (R)EPAs with the EU, in which case-and
as long  as they are  not EBA countries--they  are  likely to lose  some of the preferences
they currently  receive  from the  EU (they  will  still have access  to the GSP).  Thus, the
potential loss of the benefits of preferential access to the EU for non-EBA countries must
be taken into account. But, as discussed below,  even with the loss of preferential  access
to the EU-whose value has been falling over time and has been estimated at 2% over the
GSP  (Generalized  System  of Preferences)  (EC,  1999),  the  net  impact  of (R)EPAs  is
likely to be negative.
It has been argued that since ACP countries'  trade  shares with the EU are  large,
trade diversion  is likely to be  small. In fact, there is no direct link between  trade shares
and  trade  diversion  (Schiff  1997;  2001).  More  importantly,  large  import  shares  imply
large  transfers  from  ACP  countries  to the EU.  Only if the EU  were  the  only  supplier
before  ACP-EU  FTAs  were formed  because  the EU was the cheapest  source  (possibly
17due to lower transport costs),8 or if its supply were highly elastic at the world price so that
it became the only supplier after the FTA was formed, would the ACP countries  gain on
the  import  side  from  a  RIA  with  the  EU.  However,  empirical  work  suggests  that
situations where RIAs lead to such corner  solutions  are infrequent  (Amjadi and Winters
1999) while  Winters (forthcoming)  argues that the bulk of ACP imports  are likely to be
supplied both by EU and non-EU suppliers.
Page  (2000,  p.  7)  lists  several  studies  showing  the  negative  impact  of REPAs
between  ACP  countries  and the  EU.  For  Southern  Africa,  a  study  by  Bussolo  (1999)
examines SADC's policy options. He concludes that unilateral  trade liberalization  (UTL)
by  all SADC  members  is  superior to  a FTA  between  SADC  and the  EU.  SACU  gains
about the same under both scenarios,  but the rest of SADC gains about three times more
under UTL.  Real  wages  also rise more under  UTL. Note  that these  results obtain even
though  the  study  tends  to  favor  regional  integration  by  assuming  competition  and
products differentiated by country of origin.
For Eastern Africa,  McKay et al.  (2000)  estimate the  impact of a REPA  between
the  EAC  (Kenya,  Tanzania,  Uganda)  and  the  EU  in  a  model  where  EAC  imports  are
either  supplied  by  EU  or by  non-EU  exporters  but not by both.  This  implies  that  the
REPA results  in a decline  in consumer prices,  biasing  the results  in favor of the REPA.
Nevertheless,  they find that the welfare effect of the REPA is negative for the EAC.
One way to minimize the losses  from transfers to the EU is for ACP countries to
lower their external  trade  barriers.  A  second  solution would be to  have  ACP countries
enter into RIAs with the rest of the OECD (Organisation for Economic  Co-operation  and
Development)  (and possibly other  countries).  Small  states and all ACP  countries  would
8 This would be equivalent to unilateral liberalization.
18benefit from liberalizing trade with the entire OECD rather than just with the EU because
domestic prices would be more likely to fall and their economies would be more likely to
benefit from competitive  pressures.  And they would  gain from expanding  market access
to  additional  markets.  Moreover,  expanding  market  access  to  the  entire  OECD  would
mitigate  the  hub-and-spoke  problem  that  ACP  countries  might  face  from  reciprocal
market access with the EU.  Such a solution may be politically feasible given the fact that
the US has signed an Africa Bill providing  some preferences  in the US market, and that
Caribbean  countries  benefit  from  preferential  access  in  the  US  (Caribbean  Basin
Initiative) and in Canada (CARIBCAN) and are negotiating the FTAA.
Finally,  small  states  could  benefit  from  further  integration  in  the  multilateral
trading system.  This has the. potential of providing the best solution because  it would not
discriminate  against small  states and  other  non-EBA  developing  countries  that  are  not
members  of the ACP.  And it would  also help mitigate the hub-and-spoke  problem ACP
countries might face in a reciprocal agreement with the EU.
As for the EBA initiative, Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga  (2001)  show that the benefits
for LDCs are  small  if restricted  to the  EU but  would be  significant  if expanded  to  the
QUAD (Canada,  the EU, Japan and the US).  And they would of course be even larger if
expanded to the  entire OECD.  Note  that the  EBA  initiative  for LDCs  is  likely  to hurt
non-LDC developing countries  for two reasons.  First,  any expansion of LDC exports to
the EU is likely to be mainly trade diversion away from exporters who are not quite poor
enough  to  qualify  for  EBA  preferences,  because  it  is  the  latter  who  are  currently
exporting the  goods that compete with those  of EBA countries  in EU markets.  Second,
Srinivasan  (2001)  argues  that special  and more  favorable  treatment to LDCs may  give
19OECD  countries  an  excuse to  delay  the  full  opening  of their markets  to exports  from
developing countries in general.
4.3. Technical Assistance  for "Behind the Border" Reform
Small  states  and  other developing  countries  are  likely to benefit  from technical
assistance from the EU (and other OECD countries) in the areas of legal  and institutional
reform.  These  areas  include  sanitary  and  phyto-sanitary  (SPS)  standards,  technical
standards,  investment  code,  competition  law,  property  rights,  and  contract  law.  Such
"behind the  border"  reforms  are  likely  to  expand  trade  and  raise  economic  growth  by
increasing  efficiency  as well  as  domestic  and  foreign investment,  and  benefits  will be
greater if the reforms  are applied on a MFN basis.  EU  assistance  in the area of "behind
the border" reform is part of the Cotonou Agreement.
Finger and Schuler  (2000) argue in the context  of the Uruguay Round that  "one
size does not fit all."  This principle  also  applies to  the  support for "behind the border"
reforms provided in the context of a North-South RIA.  Support for legal and institutional
reform  by the North based on some harmonization  principle, whereby  institutions of the
South  are  brought  up  to  par  with  those  of the  North,  may not  provide  the  expected
benefits. A superior strategy would be to provide technical support that is adapted to the
specific  needs of the receiving  countries.  Thus,  assistance by the North should  focus on
country-specific  "behind the border" reform of institutions and policies in the South. The
North should also provide assistance in the implementation of WTO commitments.
204.4. Credibility and FDI
It  has  been  claimed  in  the  literature  that  North-South  integration,  such  as  the
Cotonou Agreement,  will provide small states and other Southern partners with improved
credibility  with respect  to their  economic  policies,  and  that  this  will  attract  increased
flows of FDI.  For instance,  Whalley (1996)  argues  that NAFTA  (North American  Free
Trade  Agreement)  had  such an  impact  for  Mexico.  It  is argued  here  that  Mexico  is  a
special case and that North-South RIAs can only enhance the credibility of the Southern's
partner's policies if the partner already reformed its policies unilaterally.
First, Mexico  had unilaterally reformed  its economic policies before NAFTA was
formed.  Second, a developing country is only likely to gain credibility from a RIA with a
large Northern partner if the latter is willing to impose sanctions whenever the  Southern
partner violates some aspect of the agreement (Schiff and Winters, 2001).
In  other  words,  the  Southern  partner  must  be  sufficiently  important  for  the
Northern partner to invest resources  in the careful  monitoring  of the Southern  partner's
behavior  with respect  to  all  aspects  of the  agreement  and  in the  process  of imposing
sanctions.  This is clearly the case for Mexico which has a long border with the US,  from
(or through)  which  most immigrants  and drugs  enter  the  US,  and  whose  political  and
social  stability  matters  greatly  to  the  US.  This  is  less  likely  to  hold  for  small  states
located  far  away  from  the  EU,  though  it  may  be  more  likely  to  hold for  Caribbean
countries which are also a source of migration to the US.
On the issue of credibility and unilateral reforms, the difference  after accession to
the EU between Greece on the one hand, and Portugal  on the other, is quite revealing.  By
acceding  to the EU,  these countries  adopted the entire "acquis communautaire"  and were
21thus much more closely integrated with the other EU countries than will be the case with
small  states  in the  Cotonou Agreement  or  in the FTAA.  Nevertheless,  Greece  did not
experience  rapid increases  in inflows of FDI and growth while Portugal did. The reason
is that Portugal took advantage of the new opportunities provided by accession to the EU
to  implement  macroeconomic  policy  reforms  while  Greece  did  not.  On the  contrary,
transfers from the EU enabled Greece to postpone needed reforms.
Thus, North-South integration  is not  sufficient to  enhance policy credibility  and
increase  domestic and foreign investment, and it may not be necessary for most countries.
A  necessary  condition  seems to  be the existence  of liberal,  transparent  and sustainable
domestic policies.
4.5. Hub and Spokes
The  EU  has  signed  FTA agreements  with  Mediterranean  countries  (Euro-Med
Agreements),  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  (Europe  Agreements),  South
Africa and Mexico, and is negotiating with MERCOSUR and Chile. If, as proposed in the
Cotonou  Agreement,  ACP  countries  were  to  sign  (R)EPAs  with  the  EU,  they  would
become one of many spokes of the EU hub.  And, other things equal, investors prefer to
invest in the exporting  sectors of the hub than in those of the spokes,  because they can
reach all the spokes from the hub but cannot do so from one of the spokes.
Consequently, ACP countries  should try to become hubs themselves. The problem
is likely to be less critical  for  small Caribbean  states than for African and  Pacific  ones
because  of the  Caribbean  countries'  preferential  access to the US  and  Canada and the
22negotiations  on the  FTAA.  However,  at least  for African  and Pacific  small  states,  the
hub-and-spoke  argument provides an additional  reason why they should also try to enter
into RIAs with the rest of the OECD, as well as pursue multilateral trade  liberalization.
5.  Conclusion
This  paper  examined  the  options  for  small  states  facing  a  changing  external
environment.  The  focus has been  on the  Cotonou Agreement which codifies the change
to reciprocal relations with the EU,  the erosion of preferences  in EU markets, the EBA,
and the FTAA.
The analysis presented leads to the following conclusions:
South-South  RIAs  among  small  states,  or  between  them  and  other  developing
countries, are unlikely to raise welfare for the bloc as a whole and are likely to lower
welfare for the smaller and less developed partner countries. Thus:
*  South-South RIAs  should lower external trade  barriers, whether unilaterally (in a
FTA) or by lowering the CET (in a customs union) as this will raise welfare  and
reduce tensions among partner countries;
*  Small states and other developing countries  should intensify South-South regional
cooperation in the area of regional public goods;
Theory  and empirical  work has  shown that (R)EPAs between  ACP  countries  (small
and  other)  and  the  EU  in the  frame  of the  Cotonou  Agreement  is  likely to  lower
welfare  for the  former.  Caribbean  countries  are  likely  to do  better if the  FTAA  is
formed.  Consequently:
23*  ACP  countries  should  liberalize their  trade  regime  as it will make  the Cotonou
Agreement  more  attractive  by  reducing  the  size  of transfers  from  the  ACP
countries  to the EU;
*  Small countries  should sign FTAs with the rest of the  OECD  and should pursue
multilateral  liberalization; and
*  The  EU  and  other  OECD  countries  should  provide  country-specific  technical
assistance  for  "behind  the  border"  reforms  in  ACP  countries-something
specified in the  Cotonou Agreement--as  well as assistance  in implementing their
WTO commitments.
24Table  1. Profile of Small  States,
WVorld  ACP/  LDC  SIDS  WTO  Common-  RIA
Bank  Cotonou  wealth
Coun try  Secretariat
(.)  QJ  (3)  6___  ()  (-)  (7)
Antigua and Barbuda  X  X  X  X  CARICOMX,OECS
Bahamas  X  X  X  0  X  CARICOM'
Bahrain  - "/---  -- ~---  --------_  x  x  GCET
Barbados  ___  x  x  _  . X  X  X  - CARICOM
Belize  -_  X  X  X  X  CARIC  MOECS
Bhutan  XkL  _  __  0  SAARC
Botswana  ___._|  X  X  X  X  SACU6, SADC'
Brunei  _  Xi_  X  X  X  AFTA'
Cape Verde  XbL  X  X  X  0  ECOWAS 9
Comoros  - X  X  X  CBI"',  IOC"
COMESA 12
Cook Islands  COME.  _ 
Cypru_s  i  X  X  X  EU candidate"
Djibouti  xb  x  x  __  X  X__  COMESA"
Dominica  X  - X  X  - _X  CARIC0M6iOE
Eqaora  Gune  _)  __  _  ___  __  __  CEMATJ
quatorial Guinea  x  ____ _  X__  EuropeAgreemen
Fiji  X  X  X  X  X  MSGd
_  SPARTECA"
7
Gaon  X  _  . E G_abon  _  ____  X  ___  . ___  _  _  E  A'
Gambia, The  Xb/  X  X  X  X  ECOWAS9
Gren ada  XbV"  X  X  X  X  CARICOM'
OECS
3
Guinea-Bissau  X--  X  X  X  ECOWAS9
UEMOA 18
Guyana  _  x  . _  _  X  __  Kiiai  __  ___.______  ___  .X 
Kiribati  XbL  X  X  X  SPARTECA
1 7
Maldives  XE'  X  X  X  X  SAARC'
Malta  x  x  x___  _  ___
--  - --------  ---------
Marshall Islands  t  X  X  ___  X  SPARTECA.
Mauritius  _  X  X  _  __  _  CBI5  ,IOC  SADCT
COMESAI2
-------------...  .........  ...  _.  ___  ........ _.._.______-
Micronesia, Federated States  X  X  SPARTECA1 7
Nauru  ~~~  ~  ~  ~~~~X  c/  X  X
Niue  _  _  __  X  X  _
Palau  X  *id  X
Qatar  -_xa  X  GCC4
Samoa  Xb/  X  X  X  0  X  SPARTECA I
7
Sao Tome and Principe  Xbl  X  X  0  _  _o  -
Seychelles  _  _ __  X  X  OCBI__,  IOC  S  0
Solomon Islands  XkI  X  X  X  X  X  MSG'6
SPARTECA'7
_t Ki_s and Nevis  X  X  __  _  [  X  - X  X  _  _RIC0Mw0ECS_
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Bank  Cotonou  weallb
Country  Secretariat
St. Lucia  XbIP  X  X  X  X  CARICOM2 OECS'
St. Vincent and the  X  X  X  X  CARICOM
Grenadines  _
Suriname  X  X  _  ____IX  ______
Swaziland  X  _  X  X  X  X  SACUi
Tonga  ____  -_  X  X  0  X  SPARTEC'v
Trinidad and Tobago  X  X_X  X  X  CARICOM2
Tuvalu  _  ___  x  X  X  X  _______
Vanuatu  XkI*  X  X  X  0  X  MSG  '
_____________________  ________  ________  ______  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~I  SPARTECA  1
7
Total  45  41  38  14  28  35  30  _________
Jamaica  (SIDS, ComSec, IBRD, WTO), Lesotho (LDC, ComSec,  IDA, WTO),  and Namibia (ComSec, IBRD, WTO)  invited as observers to Small
States Forum though their populations are above  1.5 million.
As defined  in the Commonwealth Secretariat/World  Bank Joint Task Force report, Small States: Meeting Challenges in the
Global Economy (April 2000), "small states" includes countries with populations  of 1.5 million or less.
X  = Full membership;  Xi' Member of  IBRD only, not member of IDA;  Xkl = IDA eligible borrower;  XE  = IDA eligible
based on small islands exception; Xw  = eligible for blend funds based on small islands exception.  Xi2= Signatory to Cotonou
Agreement only.  Xit  Member in association with New Zealand.  0  =Observer status.
2 CARICOM  = Caribbean Community;
3OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean  States;
4 GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council;
5SAARC = South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation;
6  SACU  Southern African Customs Union;
7SADC = Southern African Development Community;
aAFTA = Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA;
9 ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African  States;
'° CBI = Cross-Border Initiative;
" IOC =Indian Ocean Commission;
2  COMESA = Common  Market for Eastem and Southern Africa;
13  EU candidate = candidate for accession  to the EU;
"4 CEMAC = Communaute Economique et Mondtaire de  l'Afrique centrale (Economic and Monetary Community of Central
Africa);
'5 Europe Agreement = FTA between the EU and various Central  and Eastern European  countries;
6  MSG = Melanesian  Spearhead Group (Solomon Island, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu,  and Fiji (all World Bank members);
17 SPARTECA = South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement;
'3  UEMOA  = Union Economique et Mon6taire Ouest-africaine  (West African Economic and Monetary  Union);
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